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Over the period 1995–1998 South Africa embarked 
upon an unprecedented legislative programme. In 
1998 alone, more than 120 laws were passed by the 
new democratic parliament. In the arena of criminal 
procedure and criminal law these laws were not in 
the direction of the reforms suggested by South 
Africa’s Constitution and Bill of Rights, enacted 
in 1996; instead, they were intended to convey a 
‘tough on crime’ approach. In a short space of time 
a number of protections for accused persons, many 
of which had been developed by the courts during 
apartheid to ameliorate the effects of unjust security 
detention laws, were simply swept away by legislative 
fiat, encompassed in amendments to the Criminal 
Procedure Act (CPA).1 This article seeks to describe 
and analyse the ‘tough on crime’ policy approach, 
and to assess its impact.  
The ‘tough on crime’ policy approach 
During the apartheid years it was accepted that a 
bail application was a matter of urgency: after all, a 
person’s freedom was at stake.2 But in 1997 the CPA 
was amended so that it explicitly provides in s50(6)(b) 
that an arrested person is not entitled to be brought 
to court after hours.3 Bringing bail applications 
after hours was a common practice in magistrate’s 
courts before 1998, and prior to 1994 the courts 
on a number of occasions confirmed the right of 
an accused to bring a bail application within the 48 
hours envisaged by the then section 50; some went 
so far as to say there was a duty on the part of the 
state to co-operate and make it possible for a bail 
application to take place.4 Commentators at the time 
voiced their dissatisfaction at the change, noting: 
‘The irony inherent in this reactionary measure is, of 
course, striking: a procedural human right deemed 
under the old order through creative and enlightened 
judicial interpretation has been summarily taken away 
by decree of the new order.’5
Protective limits on the length of time for which 
bail applications may be postponed for further 
investigation were undone in 1995.6 Section 50(7), 
which contained a time limit of a day on delaying bail 
applications for the purpose of further investigations, 
was deleted and replaced,7 and subsequently 
tweaked by the Amendment Act 62 of 2000, which 
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The ‘tough on crime’ approach embodied in bail and sentencing law has had a profound impact on the 
trends around remand detention, including prison overcrowding of such an extent that it is estimated to have 
contributed to an additional 8 500 natural deaths in custody. Ultimately the policies have led, in practice, to an 
‘Alice in Wonderland’ effect: fewer people are being tried and sentenced, while more than ever are denied their 
freedom without ever being tried in a court of law.  
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provides for the postponement of a bail application 
for seven days at a time if the court, inter alia, thinks 
it has insufficient information to make a decision on 
bail, if the accused is going to be charged with a 
serious offence, or the court simply thinks it is in the 
interests of justice to do so.8  
In addition to these procedural changes relating to 
when bail applications may be heard, a greater onus 
has been placed on the accused. The court hearing 
the bail application must be satisfied that the interests 
of justice are served by release, whereas previously 
the court had to be satisfied that the interests 
of justice are served by continued detention.9 In 
relation to accused persons charged with serious 
offences listed in Schedule 6,10 such as premeditated 
murder and gang rape, bail has all but been ruled 
out. Section 60(11) places the onus on an accused 
charged with such an offence to adduce evidence to 
satisfy the court that exceptional circumstances exist, 
which, in the interests of justice, permit release.11 
This is called a ‘reverse onus’ and implies that if an 
accused charged with a Schedule 6 offence at the 
bail application provides no evidence, or provides 
unexceptional evidence in support of the contention 
that the interests of justice will be served by his 
release, he will not be released on bail. 
In relation to Schedule 512 offences, which are 
serious offences such as murder and rape that 
have not been aggravated by additional factors 
(such as premeditation in the case of murder), the 
amendments require that ‘the accused be detained 
in custody until he or she is dealt with in accordance 
with the law, unless the accused, having been given 
a reasonable opportunity to do so, adduces evidence 
which satisfies the court that the interests of justice 
permit his or her release’. This formulation is slightly 
less onerous than that applicable to Schedule 6 
offences. 
The Constitutional Court found that the limitation 
inherent in s60(11) (exceptional circumstances 
for Schedule 6 offences) on section 35(1)(f) of the 
Constitution, which provides that ‘everyone who 
is arrested for allegedly committing an offence 
has the right to be released from detention if the 
interests of justice permit, subject to reasonable 
conditions’, was reasonable and justifiable in our 
current circumstances of widespread violent crime.13 
The Court noted that ‘the subsection does not say 
they must be circumstances above and beyond, 
and generally different from those enumerated ... 
an accused ... could establish the requirement by 
proving there are exceptional circumstances relating 
to his or her emotional condition that render it in the 
interests of justice that release on bail be ordered 
notwithstanding the gravity of the case’.14 
It was also noted  that ‘the amendment was intended 
to make the obtaining of bail of accused persons who 
are charged with serious offences more difficult. It 
was not meant to make the obtaining of bail by these 
persons impossible’.15 Unfortunately, the provisions 
seem to have ensured that the possibility of bail in 
relation to Schedule 6 offences is likelier among those 
with expensive legal representation;16 for the vast 
majority accused of serious crimes, release is highly 
unlikely.17
A 2008 study predicted that the combined impact 
of these changes is  ‘likely to be a significant delay 
in the hearing of bail applications, an increase in 
postponements for further investigation, and a 
reduction in the number who are granted bail at first 
appearance’.18 The study did in fact find evidence of 
these trends in three courts investigated.19 However, 
many crime-weary South Africans appeared to 
welcome these amendments to bail law, as many 
believed at the time that ‘criminals have too many 
rights’.20 
In response to public perceptions of leniency in 
sentencing,21 tough sentences were also introduced 
in 1997.22 Counter-intuitively termed ‘minimum 
sentencing’, the legislation prescribing tough 
sentences for serious crime was a response to an 
earlier Constitutional Court judgement that had found 
the death penalty to be unconstitutional.23 At the 
time of this judgement, the public believed crime in 
South Africa had escalated24 and public sympathy 
was against the abolition of the death penalty.25 
Consequently there was a need to demonstrate 
that government was ‘tough on crime’, and thus 
‘minimum’ sentences of life imprisonment were 
legislated for crimes that previously might have 
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incurred the death penalty. Other ‘minimums’ were 
also provided for. Minimums are applicable even in 
relation to first offenders, unlike the ‘three strikes’ 
law applicable in some US and Australian states. 
The minimum sentencing provisions commenced on 
1 May 1998,26 and the initial period of their validity 
was only two years.27 After two years the provisions 
were explicitly renewed by the President with the 
agreement of the legislature.28 These minimum 
sentencing provisions were renewed on a number 
of occasions, and almost ten years later the renewal 
requirements were deleted, making minimum 
sentencing permanent.29 A summary of the minimum 
sentencing provisions and their applicable sentences 
appears in the tables below. Their introduction 
occasioned further amendments to the sentencing 
jurisdiction of the lower courts. 
Table 1.1: Summary of minimum sentencing 
offences (Schedule 2)30
Table 1.2: Prescribed sentences (section 51)31
Penalty on: PART I PART II PART III PART IV
1st offence life 15 years 10 years 5 years
2nd offence life 20 years 15 years 7 years
3rd or 
subsequent 
offence
life 25 years 20 years 10 years
At the time of the introduction of minimum sentences, 
only the high courts, which generally hear fewer than 
1% of criminal cases, had the sentencing jurisdiction 
to impose many of these sentences. Consequently, 
soon after the minimum sentencing provisions came 
into effect, the sentencing jurisdiction of the regional 
courts was extended to 15 years’ (from 10 years’) 
imprisonment, and the district courts’ jurisdiction 
was extended to three years’ (from 12 months’) 
imprisonment.32 
A messy period of almost a decade (1998–2007) 
followed, during which regional courts were 
empowered to hear life imprisonment matters, but 
had to refer them to the high courts for sentencing. 
Incidentally, a parliamentary study found that in 
one in ten such cases the high court ended up 
acquitting the accused, who had been found guilty 
in the regional court.33 Ultimately the regional courts 
were empowered in December 2007 to hand down 
sentences of life imprisonment in these matters.34 
The automatic right of appeal that went with these 
sentences was legislatively removed – possibly 
unintentionally – in April 2010.35 
Some analysts predicted that this jurisdictional 
change would sharply increase the number of people 
convicted and sentenced to prison, simply because 
the regional courts have the capacity to hear many 
more cases than the high courts. The next section 
reveals that the number of people handed down long 
sentences has indeed increased – but not the total 
number convicted and sentenced year-on-year. 
The impact of ‘tough on crime’  
policy changes 
The practical impact of the changed bail and 
sentencing framework was borne most obviously 
by the Department of Correctional Services (DCS). 
Part I Part II Part III Part IV 
Life Fifteen 
years 
Ten years Five years
Some 
aggravated 
murders, 
such as pre-
meditated 
murder 
Murders not 
covered in 
Part I
Rapes not 
covered in 
Part I
All offences 
in Schedule 
1 of the 
Criminal 
Procedure 
Act, where 
committed 
with firearm 
Some 
aggravated 
rapes, such 
as gang 
rape 
Some 
aggravated 
robbery 
(including 
hijacking)
Some 
indecent 
assault
Some 
aggravated 
terrorism 
offences 
Some drug 
dealing
Some 
assault GBH
  Some 
firearms 
offences
 Some white 
collar crime 
(including 
corruption)
  Terrorism 
offences not 
in Part I
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This is immediately apparent in the figures for the 
total remand population by month. Between 1995 
and 1996, after the first amendments, the number 
of people held pre-trial at month end increased by 
50%, from around 20 000 to 30 000 people. By the 
end of April 1998 almost 43 000 people were held, 
compared to the almost 18 000 held in May 1995 – a 
staggering 138% increase in only three years. After 
the 1998 amendments came into effect, there was a 
further steep increase until April 2000, when a peak 
of almost 60 000 people held pre-trial was reached. 
In only five years the pre-trial population in prisons 
had tripled.  
Figure 1: Remand population in prisons as at 
month end, 1995–201236
are closer to 190 000 (largely because of the massive 
increase in remand inmates) there is closer to one 
death for every 110 inmates. In other words, a 35% 
increase in total population has more than doubled 
the rate of natural death. Using this relationship, it can 
be calculated that, had inmate populations remained 
at around 140 000, some 8 500 natural deaths would 
probably not have occurred in the period 1998 to 
2011.39  
Figure 3: Relationship between rate of natural 
deaths per year and inmate population from   
31 march 1998–201140
Figure 2: number of deaths due to natural causes 
in prisons, 1998–201138
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esSince that peak, the pre-trial population has hovered 
around the 50 000 mark, with some seasonal dips to 
the 40 000 mark. 
During the remand peak from 2000 to 2004, prisons 
were bursting at the seams, holding 170 000 to 
190 000 people, a large proportion of whom were 
untried, in facilities designed for just over 100 000 
people.37 Overcrowding leads to less than ideal 
conditions of detention, including the spread of 
communicable diseases. Unsurprisingly, these 
conditions of overcrowding led to a steep increase in 
the number of deaths from natural (i.e. not violent or 
accidental) causes. 
Plotting the inmate population since 1995 in prisons 
against the rate of natural deaths per 100 000 
inmates shows that not only does the number of 
deaths increase as the inmate population grows, but 
also the rate of death. At around a total population 
of 140 000, there is on average one death a year for 
every 250 inmates. Where total inmate populations 
The trend in natural deaths is likely to have been 
influenced by a high prevalence of HIV and 
tuberculosis. Anti-retroviral roll-out in prisons only 
began in 2006 at three sites,41 just after the peak 
in inmate population numbers over the 2003–2005 
period. Official prison capacity by the end of February 
2011 was only 118 154 – yet at one point during this 
period the number incarcerated tipped 190 000.
29SA Crime QuArterly No. 48 • juNe 2014
Figure 4: total inmate population, 1998–201042
In response to excessive inmate numbers – see the 
graph above – the DCS motivated for presidential 
‘special remissions of sentences’, leading to the early 
release of 33 972 sentenced prisoners during 2005.43 
In addition, consideration of parole44 at the earliest 
possible parole date45 has now become the norm.46 
This is increasingly essential as prisoners with longer 
sentences (in excess of ten years) continue to replace 
those with shorter sentences. By 2011 the number of 
prisoners with sentences of more than ten years had 
almost quadrupled, to more than 50 000. 
Figure 5: composition of the total prison 
population by sentence status, 1995, 2000, 2005 
and 201147
The drivers of the remand population 
What causes high remand populations? The 
number of remand detainees on any particular day 
is influenced by two trends – how many people 
are admitted to remand, and how long each of 
them remains in detention. What do the data say 
about how many people were admitted to remand 
detention?  
The legislative changes discussed above were likely 
to have increased the number of people denied bail 
and admitted to remand. If arrests had remained 
constant or had increased, then the number admitted 
to remand should have increased, and analysis of the 
data shows that admissions rose considerably during 
the initial period of the new laws. In 1995/1996 just 
over 230 000 people were admitted on remand. This 
increased to almost 299 000 by the year 1999/2000 
– in other words, four years later, 67 000 or 29% 
more people were admitted on remand than in 
1995/1996. Another two years later 311 013 were 
admitted on remand. Subsequently, however, remand 
admissions dropped to the point where in 2010/11 
there were fewer such admissions than there had 
been in 1995/6. What accounts for this trend? 
Figure 6: number of people admitted on remand 
(un-sentenced admissions) to prisons, 1995/6–
2010/1150
The question arises whether the drop in remand 
admissions down to 1995/6 levels is due to a drop 
in the number of arrests, particularly priority crime 
arrests, which are more likely to result in a denial of 
bail. This is not the case. Comparing 2002/3 – the 
peak of remand admissions – to 2010/11 shows 
a 55% increase in priority crime arrests (which are 
more likely to result  in denial of bail), from 444 738 
Since 1994, imprisonment capacity has increased 
by approximately 20 000, which is still not nearly 
enough.48 However, the DCS has limited control49 
over one of the key drivers of the size of the total 
inmate population – a high remand population, which 
is around twice the size it was in 1995. 
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to 688 937.51 Consequently the drop in remand 
admissions cannot be attributed to a drop in arrests. 
Figure 7: Number of priority crime arrests, 2001/2–
2012/1352 
cells being used for prolonged remand detention 
because ‘prisons are full’.53 Indeed, some prisons are 
holding more than double their approved capacity.54 
The 2013 White Paper on Corrections and the White 
Paper on Remand Detention, however, seek to 
affirm that after 5 March 2012 the holding of remand 
detainees in police cells after first appearance is not 
legal.55  
Using the 70% figure for 2002/3 (of priority arrests 
converted to remand admission) as a benchmark 
would suggest that a potential 250 000 people were 
probably admitted to police cells rather than to prison 
remand after first appearance in 2010/11. This is of 
great concern, given that police cells do not have 
facilities for the adequate care of detainees held 
for prolonged periods. Arrests continue to rise: in 
2012/13 the SAPS reported 806 298 priority crime 
arrests and a further 876 476 ‘other’ arrests. 
The fact that the remand population in prisons 
remains high, despite the drop in admissions to 
prison on remand, must then relate to the duration 
of remand detention. One of the theorised effects of 
minimum sentencing for the pre-trial phase was that 
persons accused of such offences would be loath 
to plead guilty, given that the bar is now set so high 
on their potential punishment. This could lead to 
backlogs and general slowing of the system. Given 
that such persons would highly likely be denied bail 
under the bail amendments, they would also highly 
likely be incarcerated awaiting trial for an extended 
length of time. Their continued incarceration before 
the commencement of trial could, it was theorised, 
lull the state into taking its time in preparing a case 
against the accused. 
In 1995, there were remand admissions of 
230 000 and a remand population of around 20 000, 
suggesting that the average duration of detention 
in 1995 must have been around one month. By 
2000, admissions of almost 300 000 and a remand 
population of 60 000 suggests that the average 
duration of detention must have doubled to around 
2,4 months. In 2010/2011 there were 227 664 
admissions but a population of around 46 500 – 
suggesting the average duration of detention has 
remained at around 2,4 months. 
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What has reduced is the extent to which such arrests 
translate into remand admission into prisons. In 
2002/3 the remand admissions figure was 70% of 
the priority crime arrests figure (in the previous year 
there were more remand admissions than priority 
crime arrests). By 2008/9 the ratio of remand arrests 
had dropped to 53%; in 2010/11 it was only 33%. 
How can this be explained, given that the legislative 
framework in relation to bail remains strict? 
Figure 8: Remand admissions expressed as 
percentage of priority crime arrests 
A possible explanation is that an increasing 
proportion of people are being held for extended 
periods in police cells, rather than in prisons – often  
because prisons refuse to take any more: a number 
of oversight visits by national and provincial Members 
of Parliament over the last decade mention police 
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The back-of-the-envelope ‘average duration’ 
calculations above provide a putative average of 
the duration of detention. Averages are not the best  
measures of the ‘central tendency’ of a population 
that is asymmetrically distributed – in other words, 
populations where there is a fixed minimum for the 
measure at hand (in this case duration of detention 
cannot be less than zero) and a maximum that can 
increase in size indefinitely. The department has 
therefore provided ‘snapshot’ figures of the time 
spent in remand at a particular date over the period 
2009–2012. 
Figure 9: number of people held for various 
durations on remand, 2009–201256
Figure 10: number of people held for more than 
one year on remand, 2009–201257
The number of people in custody on remand for 
more than three months comprised more than half 
of remand detainees as at March 2012. (Recall that 
the putative average in 1995 was one month.) The 
number in custody for more than a year comprised 
almost 18% in 2012 (or one in six remand inmates), 
whereas in 2009 this percentage was only 13% (one 
in eight). Indeed, by March 2012 some 5% (or one 
in 20) had spent more than two years in custody. 
In other words, all the longer time categories have 
experienced growth over the period 2009 to 2012, 
while all the shorter time categories have reduced in 
size, suggesting a general and continued lengthening 
of the duration of remand detention over this time 
period.  
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Is the remand trend justified 
by court outcomes? 
In short then, the data show that fewer people are 
being admitted on remand to prisons, but for much 
longer time periods. Can it be assumed that such long 
pre-trial incarcerations on remand are ultimately justified 
by eventual convictions? Over the initial time period 
after the legislative changes the number of people 
sentenced to imprisonment and admitted to prisons 
did indeed rise 24% from 1995/6 to 2001/2 (see Figure 
7). This coincided with the peak in the size of the total 
prison population over the period thereafter until the 
special remissions that occurred in 2005.
Figure 11: number of sentenced people admitted to 
Correctional Centres, 1995–2010
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After the peak in 2001/2 there was a steady decrease 
in the number of sentenced admissions. Yearly 
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remand admissions, by contrast, dropped below 
their 1995/6 levels only in 2010/11, while sentenced 
admissions did so in 2002/3 and decreased 
further thereafter. Yet, despite the drop in remand 
admissions, the remand population remains more 
than double the size it was in 1995. 
Figure 12: number of sentenced and remand 
admissions, 1995–2011
What has been driving the drop in sentenced 
admissions? Sentenced admissions are admissions 
of people who are convicted, and then sentenced 
to a term of imprisonment, rather than with a non-
custodial sentence. Has the number of convictions 
dropped, or is it the extent to which sentences that 
include a term of imprisonment have dropped?  
The National Prosecuting Authority Act, which 
created the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA), 
was promulgated in October 1998. Initially the newly 
formed NPA reported data on the finalisation of cases 
in the reporting period January to December; prior 
to that the individual provincial Attorneys-General did 
not report on their work in a uniform manner. The 
2001/2 NPA Annual Report included data for 1999, 
2000 and 2001 on the number of finalisations and the 
conviction rate.58 
According to these data, convictions increased 
sharply over this time period, by 55%. From 2002/3 
the reporting period changed to run from March to 
February each year.59 The further jump in convictions, 
comparing January to December 2001 with March 
2002 to February 2003, of another 41% in a single 
year suggests there may have been a further change 
in reporting practices that occurred at the same time, 
that influenced the number of convictions recorded. 
Assuming there was no such change in reporting 
practices, the increase in convictions, comparing the 
year January to December 1999 to the year March 
2002 to February 2003, was a staggering 117%. 
Figure 14: Number of convictions, 1999–2001,60 
2002/3 to 2012/1361
2010/2011
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In 1995/6 the 230 000 remand admissions were 
matched by 200 000 sentenced admissions; in other 
words, there was an approximately 85% conversion 
of remand to sentenced imprisonment in 1995/6. Put 
differently, just over one person was sent to remand 
for every person convicted and imprisoned in the 
same year. By 2007/8 this had worsened to 31%; in 
2010 the ratio was 35%. Almost three times as many 
people were sent to remand as were convicted in the 
last years for which data are available. In 2010/11, 
some 150 000 people were sent to prison on remand 
who were not subsequently imprisoned as a result of 
a conviction in the same year. The ‘conversion rate’ 
is likely to be far worse if remand detention in police 
cells is taken into account. 
Figure 13: Percentage of remand admissions 
matched by sentenced admission 
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From 2002/3, however, the trend changes 
dramatically towards an overall decrease in the 
number of convictions. Consequently it appears that 
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the reduction in the number of sentenced admissions 
is partly a result of the trend towards a reduction in 
the number of convictions apparent from 2002/3. 
Figure 15: Number of convictions, 2002/3–2012/13 
verdict after’.62 What is clear is that the number of 
people held on remand in prisons is decreasing, the 
time for which they are held on remand in prisons is 
increasing, and the likelihood that they will ever be 
sentenced to a term of imprisonment is decreasing. 
Conclusion 
The ‘tough on crime’ policy approach embodied 
in the tightening of bail laws and lengthy minimum 
sentences has had, over the long term, an 
unanticipated impact. After an initial period in which 
the DCS bore the brunt of predicted and massive 
increases in the total prison population, there was a 
subsequent stabilisation. 
Prior to stabilisation, the twin unsustainable bail and 
sentencing policies led to conditions of detention 
resulting in more deaths from natural causes due to 
overcrowding in just over a decade, than the number 
of death penalty deaths during the apartheid era.63 
As a result the criminal justice system developed 
methods to ameliorate the impact of these 
unsustainable policies. Some prisons refused to 
accept any more remand detainees, and detainees 
were then held at police stations. The full extent 
to which this occurred and continues to occur, is 
unclear. 
The criminal justice trends suggest that, in addition, 
the system has generally slowed down and cut back 
on the number of people it chooses to prosecute,64 
the number it convicts, and the speed with which 
it does so, leading to a reduction in the number of 
people sentenced year-on-year. 
The sentenced prison population is increasingly 
composed of those with longer sentences, but most 
will be released on parole at the earliest possible 
parole date. 
In short, durations of remand detention have 
increased, convictions have decreased, an 
increasingly greater proportion of people are held on 
remand than will ever be convicted, and sentences 
are less likely than ever to contain a custodial 
component.   
The ‘tough on crime’ approach has in practice turned 
into ‘justice delayed and freedom denied’. 
At the same time, however, there has been a 
commensurate reduction in the extent to which 
sentences of imprisonment accompany a guilty 
conviction. Over the period 1999 to 2001 there 
appear to have been more sentenced admissions 
than there were convictions. This may, as indicated 
above, also be the result of how convictions are 
recorded. Looking at data from 2002/3 onward, there 
is a steady downward trend in the extent to which 
convictions are matched by sentenced admissions, 
from almost 60% to less than 30%. 
Figure 16: Sentenced admissions as percentage of 
total convictions 
This suggests that convictions are increasingly 
accompanied by non-custodial sentences – or 
alternatively that convicted people are being 
sentenced to time already served on remand – the 
‘Alice in Wonderland’ scenario: ‘sentence first, 
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